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Abstract: Moving services to the Cloud is a trend that has steadly gained popularity over recent years, with a constant 
increase in sophistication and complexity of such services. Today, critical infrastructure operators are considering moving their 
services and data to the Cloud. Infrastructure vendors will inevitably take advantage of the benefits Cloud Computing has to 
offer. As Cloud Computing grows in popularity, new models are deployed to exploit even further its full capacity, one of which 
is the deployment of Cloud federations. A Cloud federation is an association among different Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) 
with the goal of sharing resources and data. In providing a larger-scale and higher performance infrastructure, federation 
enables on-demand provisioning of complex services. In this paper we convey our contribution to this area by outlining our 
proposed methodology that develops a robust collaborative intrusion detection methodology in a federated Cloud environment. 
For collaborative intrusion detection we use the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence to fuse the beliefs provided by the 
monitoring entities, taking the final decision regarding a possible attack. Protecting the federated Cloud against cyber attacks 
is a vital concern, due to the potential for significant economic consequences. 
Keywords: critical infrastructure; Cloud computing; Cloud federation; collaboration; intrusion detection; dempster-shafer; 
fusion algorithm; OPNET.
1. Introduction 
Cloud Computing is being adopted in critical sectors such as 
energy, transport, and finance. This makes Cloud Computing 
services critical in themselves. Cloud Computing is a model in 
which vast quantities of computer resources are used to provide 
services to many concurrent users. The services may be offered 
directly or as part of a composite system. The greater scalability 
and larger size of Clouds compared to traditional service 
hosting infrastructure, involve more complex monitoring 
systems, which have to be scalable and robust. Therefore, 
monitoring systems and intrusion detection systems (IDSs) 
must be refined and adapted to different situations in Cloud 
environments.  
To embrace this challenge, we propose a methodology that 
develops a robust collaborative IDS in a federated Cloud 
environment. Our approach offers a proactive collaborative 
model for Cloud intrusion detection based on the distribution of 
responsibilities. The responsibility for managing the elements 
of the Cloud is distributed among several monitoring nodes. 
Our architecture consists of four major entities: the Cloud 
Broker, the Monitoring Nodes, the Local Coordinator (Super 
Nodes), and the Global Coordinator (Command and Control 
server: C2). For collaborative intrusion detection, we use the 
Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence. Dempster-Shafer is used 
to collect and fuse the beliefs provided by the monitoring 
entities. Collaboration among Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) 
can ensure that they are up to date on different Cloud threats. 
Our current work focuses on the deployment of such a solution 
for CSP collaboration: Security as a Service.  
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 provides 
background on the research problem we have identified, namely 
the critical infrastructure and Cloud computing progression, 
and the associated benefits and vulnerabilities of Cloud 
federations, and the Big Data connection. In Section 3 we 
discuss related work in the area and present our analysis. In 
Section 4 we outline our collaborative intrusion detection 
methodology for federated Cloud environments, “Security as a 
Service”. Section 5 details Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence 
and its involvement in our decision making process. In Section 
6 we convey our implementation details, and present our 
conclusions and future work in Section 7. 
2. Background 
2.1. Critical Infrastructure and Cloud Computing 
utilisation 
As more sectors utilise Cloud-based services in their 
computing environment, Critical Infrastructure services are 
likely to adopt this paradigm. Utilising Cloud Computing 
within an environment that historically has not had any Internet 
connectivity would appear trivial to some, however research 
has shown that Cloud Computing will reach the Information 
and Communication Technology (ICT) services that are 
operating critical infrastructure [1]–[4]. Operators of critical 
infrastructures, in particular the ICT that supports gas and 
electricity utilities and government services, are considering 
using the Cloud to provision their high assurance services. This 
is reflected in a white paper produced by the European Network 
and Information Security Agency (ENISA) in 2011 [2], which 
provides specific guidelines in this area, highlighting the 
technical, policy and legal implications. 
Cloud Computing can be conveyed as the next logical 
progression within the critical infrastructure industry as the 
Cloud paradigm is already being used for crucial assets. The 
increasing flexibility and unpredictable usage of such utilities 
often means that many challenges such as load balancing can 
occur in the utility networks we use. The usage of modern ICT 
systems to control and manage critical infrastructure helps in 
dealing with such issues [3]. Many operators do not have the 
infrastructure to support the growing need for accurate 
predictive and historical simulations imposed by the adoption 
of renewable energy sources and the on-going development of 
smart grids. To overcome this, Cloud Computing allows these 
operators to reduce or avoid over investment in hardware 
resources and their associated maintenance [5]. 
In November 2012 seven of the world's leading 
telecommunication network operators selected the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) to be the home 
of the Industry Specification Group for NFV (Network 
Functions Virtualisation). ETSI ISG NFV (ETSI Industry 
Specific Groups for Network Functions Virtualisation) [6] was 
formed with the purpose of developing pre-standards for 
moving telecommunications functions to the Cloud Computing 
environment. The NFV ISG’s mission is to facilitate the 
industry transformation and development of an open, 
interoperable, ecosystem through specification, implementation 
and deployment experience. Other critical infrastructure service 
operators from the traffic and transportation, and infrastructure 
surveillance systems domain are expected to follow soon. The 
promised advantages do not only relate to cost reductions and 
increased flexibility, but also new ways to improve the 
resilience and availability of the critical infrastructure, e.g., 
through the use of abundant virtual resources [4]. 
An industry who could benefit from this application is the 
UK energy community as Cloud Computing can address at least 
two fundamental requirements. Firstly, accurate network 
simulations require highly variable quantities of computational 
resources depending on the contingent situation of energy 
delivery or on the type of energy delivered. Renewable energy 
output is typically much less predictable than the constant 
output offered by conventional generation sources, such as coal, 
oil, gas, or nuclear. For this reason, running simulations on the 
Cloud allows for dynamic scaling of the required computational 
and data resources [1]. 
Deploying high assurance services in the Cloud increases 
cyber security concerns, as successful attacks could lead to 
outages of key services that our society depends on, and 
disclosure of sensitive personal information. However, this 
exposes these infrastructures to cyber risks and results in 
demand for protection against cyber attacks, even more than 
traditional systems. Security is a major concern in Cloud 
adoption. Critical security issues include data integrity, user 
confidentiality, and trust among providers, individual users, and 
user groups. Additionally, availability issues and real world 
impact would be the main concern for providers of critical 
infrastructure, depending upon the operations or services they 
are hosting [7]. There are security issues at each level of the 
Cloud Computing paradigm. Nonetheless, utilising the Cloud 
environment is a natural extension of remote access as it 
removes the requirement for the user to be in the same location 
as the infrastructure which is already commonplace.  
Critical infrastructure imposes much stronger requirements 
for security, reliability, and resilience on Cloud Computing 
environments. Issues also surround data being exchanged 
across multiple countries that have different laws and 
regulations concerning data traversal, protection requirements, 
and privacy laws. Examples of such risks include, but not 
limited to, risks resulting from possible changes of jurisdiction 
and the liability or obligation of the vendor in case of loss of 
data and/or business interruption [8]. As evident, their 
connexion will provide many benefits in the form of scalability, 
improved performance, reachability, and will be cost effective 
for organisations and infrastructure vendors, however the 
distributed and open structure of Cloud Computing and services 
becomes an attractive target for potential cyber-attacks by 
intruders. Despite security issues slowing its adoption, Cloud 
Computing has already become a persistent force; thus, security 
mechanisms to ensure its secure adoption are an immediate 
need. 
2.2. Cloud Federations 
Cloud Computing hides resource availability issues making 
this infrastructure appealing to users with varying 
computational requirements: from storage applications to 
intensive computing tasks. Large-scale parallel simulations 
often require computational time on high performance 
computing machines and clusters. In a Cloud Computing 
environment resources are shared among multiple users. The 
number and nature of the workload presented by these users can 
vary over time. As Cloud Computing grows in popularity, new 
models are deployed to exploit even further its full capacity. 
One of these ideas is the deployment of Cloud federations.  
Federated Clouds are a logical evolution of the centralised 
approach. They involve multiple Clouds that are tied together 
to build a larger one. This can enhance reliability through 
physical partitioning of the resource pool and address 
communication latency issues by binding clients to the nearest 
data centre [9]. Furthermore, federated Clouds are an 
interesting alternative for those companies who are reluctant to 
move their data out of house to a service provider due to 
security and confidentiality concerns. By operating on 
geographically distributed data centres, companies could still 
benefit from the advantages of Cloud Computing by running 
smaller Clouds in-house, and federating them into a larger 
Cloud [10]. 
A Cloud Federation allows final users to access transparently 
a set of resources and services, distributed among several 
independent CSP [10]. Rak et al. [10] identify the following 
actors as the key players in this scenario: 
 Final Users: common users which access the Cloud and 
uses the Cloud services. 
 Service Providers: acquire resources and services from 
the Cloud in a transparent way, and offer them to Final 
Users. 
 Service Developers: develop applications using the 
Cloud’s resources. Sometimes they also use services 
developed by other parties. 
 Cloud Service Providers: Offer Cloud resources and 
services. 
While users focus on optimising the performance of a single 
application or workflow, such as application throughput and 
user perceived response time, Cloud providers aim to obtain the 
best system throughput, use resources efficiently, or consume 
less energy. Efficient brokering policies will try to satisfy the 
user requirements and Clouds’ global performance at the same 
time [11].  
Thereby, Cloud federation introduces new avenues of 
research into brokering policies such as those techniques based 
on ensuring the required QoS level or those aiming at 
optimising the energy efficiency [11]. The goals of brokering 
methods and policies in federated Clouds can be found in 
different domains. Some examples are listed as follows [10]: 
 Cost-effectiveness: federated Clouds provide a larger 
amount of resources, which may help improve cost-
effectiveness, e.g. time to completion, increasing the 
system throughput or optimising resource utilisation. 
 Acceleration: federated Clouds can be used as 
accelerators to reduce application time-to-completion 
by using Cloud resources to exploit an additional level 
of parallelism by offloading appropriate tasks to other 
Cloud resources. 
 Conservation: federated Clouds can be used to 
conserve allocations, within the appropriate runtime 
and budget constraints. 
 Resilience: federated Clouds can be used to handle 
unexpected situations such as unanticipated downtime, 
inadequate allocations, or failures of working nodes. 
Additional Cloud resources can be requested to ease 
the impact of the unexpected situations and meet user 
objectives. 
 Energy efficiency: federated Clouds can facilitate 
optimising the energy efficiency of Clouds as multiple 
objectives can be combined as needed. An example is 
combining an acceleration objective with a resilience 
objective.  
By providing security services from within the Cloud 
provider infrastructure, enterprises are able to deploy security 
policies and rules between each virtual machine or between 
virtual machine centres. A feature of the Cloud provider 
infrastructure is that enterprises can maintain corporate security 
policies and the data collected about them with the virtual 
machines. This allows them to enforce security services in the 
enterprise and the Cloud provider consistently. 
2.3. Cyber attacks in federated Clouds 
Each interface can present specific vulnerabilities that can be 
exploited by malicious entities, e.g. users, service instances, and 
CSPs, to perform cyber attacks. The interface between a service 
instance and an user can be considered as a client-to-server 
interface, that is vulnerable to all types of attacks that are 
possible in common client-server architectures, including SQL 
injection, buffer overflow, privilege escalation, SSL certificate 
spoofing, phishing attacks, and flooding attacks [12]. 
The interface between a service instance and a CSP is 
vulnerable to all attacks that a service instance can run against 
its hosting Cloud systems, such as distributed denial of service 
(DDoS) attacks, and Cloud malware injections. In the same 
way, a malicious CSP of the Cloud Federation may perform 
several attacks towards service instances running on it. Previous 
work of ours MacDermott et al. (2014) [13] has highlighted this 
possibility, conveying how this type of attack could affect 
interdependent services and CSPs. 
DDoS is a serious and growing problem for corporate and 
government services doing business on the Internet [14]. 
Targets for DDoS attacks include the computational resources, 
the memory buffers, the application processing logic, the 
communications bandwidth, and the network protocol, whereas 
their effects on the target system are the denial or degradation 
of provided services [10]. Resource management to prevent 
DDoS attacks is receiving attention, as the Infrastructure as a 
Service (IaaS) architecture, effectively ‘supports’ the attacker. 
When the Cloud system observes the high workload on the 
flooded service, it is likely the Cloud federation will start 
providing more computational power in order to cope with it. 
Resource management also has a very important security 
function, which is to prevent the potential for DDoS attacks. For 
example, if resource management is not in place, a 
compromised virtual machine could allow an attacker to starve 
all of the other virtual machines within that Cloud of their 
needed resources. By using resource management, a 
compromised virtual machine can only affect itself and none of 
the other virtual machines within the Cloud [15]. If the Cloud 
system notices the lack of availability, it could move the 
affected service instances to other servers of the Cloud 
federation. This results in additional workload for such servers, 
and thus the flooding attack can propagate and spread 
throughout the whole Cloud federation [11].  
Unavailability of services due to Cloud outages can cause 
monetary loss to Cloud providers and operational loss to Cloud 
users. Hosting infrastructure services, and storing sensitive data 
in the Cloud environment brings with it security and resilience 
requirements that existing Cloud services are not well placed to 
address. IDS mechanisms require an extensive use of hardware, 
especially CPU and memory, and may cause unintentional 
resource exhaustion or a bottleneck. 
2.4. Intrusion Detection and Intrusion Prevention 
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) can be defined as a 
function that maps the data input into a normal or an attack 
event either by means of absence of an alert (0) or by the 
presence of an alert (1) respectively and is given by: 
 
IDS : X →{0, 1}. 
 
To detect attacks in the incoming traffic, the IDSs are 
typically parameterised by a threshold T. The IDS uses a 
theoretical basis for deciding the thresholds for analysing the 
network traffic to detect intrusions. Changing this threshold 
allows the change in performance of the IDS. If the threshold is 
very low, then the IDS tends to be very aggressive in detecting 
the traffic for intrusions. However, there is a potentially greater 
chance for the detections to be irrelevant which result in a large 
number of false alarms. A large threshold on the other hand will 
have an opposite effect; being a bit conservative in detecting 
attacks. However, potential attacks may get overlooked by this 
method [16].  
An intrusion prevention system (IPS) operates the process of 
performing intrusion detection and attempting to prevent 
detected possible incidents. The IPS is a device or software 
application that has all the capabilities of an IDS and can also 
attempt to stop certain incidents. IPSs provide security at all 
system levels, from the Operating System kernel to network 
data packets.  IPSs also have the ability to prevent known 
intrusion signatures, besides the unknown attacks originating 
from the database of generic attack behaviours. 
IDSs typically perform extensive logging of data that is 
related to detected events.  This data can be used to confirm the 
validity of alerts, investigate incidents, and correlate events 
between the IDS and other logging sources [17]. Discriminating 
IDSs based on their data sources can be classified as host based 
and network based. Host based IDSs provide local intrusion 
detection and support by monitoring user behaviour over an 
application layer protocol, such as the client-server protocol.  
Network based IDSs provide global intrusion detection, where 
they provide level monitoring of traffic flowing through the 
network and detect intrusions based on the nodes behaviour 
over the network. 
Regardless of whether they operate at the network, host or 
application level, both IDSs and IPSs use one of two detection 
methods; anomaly based or signature based. Anomaly based 
IDSs detect abnormal patterns that deviate from what is 
considered to be normal behaviour [18].  Anomaly detection 
does not require prior knowledge of intrusion and can detect 
new intrusions.  However, the drawback is that they may not be 
able to describe what an attack is and may have a high false 
positive rate. Signature based IDSs use known patterns of 
unauthorised behaviour to predict and detect subsequent similar 
attacks [19]. Such systems can accurately and efficiently detect 
instances of known attacks.  However, they lack the ability to 
detect zero day attacks. Signature databases must constantly be 
updated, and IDSs must be able to compare and match activities 
against large collections of attack signatures.    
Weaknesses with present-day IDS techniques is that they do 
not take into consideration the threat exposures in the network 
while detecting intrusions, resulting in obtaining alerts for all 
types of events, many or most of which may not be relevant to 
the operating environment [20]. In the context of dynamic 
network environments, this approach may lead to a huge 
number of unnecessary alerts. Depending on the frequency of 
changes to the network environment, this may in turn affect the 
efficacy of the IDS itself. 
Additionally, current IDSs are not devised to handle dynamic 
network environments, as they predominantly use a predefined 
set of signatures and anomaly detection thresholds to detect 
intrusions. They can also be ignorant of any changes to the 
operating environment that may eliminate or introduce 
vulnerabilities and threat exposures. Due to this weakness, it 
may miss critical attacks and detect intrusions that are not 
relevant due to changes to the environment. Hence, the threat-
awareness capability provides a key opportunity for an IDS to 
improve its detection rate [20].  
2.5. Contending with Big Data 
As we continue to contend with the vast amounts of data and 
logs generated, by both the monitoring systems and the Cloud 
user (be it critical infrastructure vendor or corporation), 
securing this data is imperative. Increasingly, research has been 
focusing on storing this information for future analysis or 
Forensic studies. 
The growing research area 'Big Data' and its associated data 
and predictive analytics studies have shown Big Data to have 
similar issues to that of Cloud security, when it comes to storing 
their data [21]. The common questions remain, what do we do 
with this data? How long do we store it for? And how can we 
ensure it maintains its integrity? 
Historical processes generate large datasets [24], but there 
needs to be sufficient procedures in place for performing data 
analytics and advice on handling these datasets. Previous work 
of ours MacDermott et al. (2013) [22] looked into how the 
Cloud environment could facilitate the storing and study of 
historical data from critical infrastructure control systems, but 
the aforementioned issues regarding dataset size and the 
longevity still remain. 
3. Related Work 
Since Cloud Computing supports a distributed service 
oriented paradigm, multi-domain and multi-users 
administrative infrastructure, it is more prone to security threats 
and vulnerabilities, such as data breaches, data loss, service 
hijacking, DDoS attacks, and malicious insiders to name a few 
[41]. In the Cloud environment, where massive amounts of data 
are generated due to high network access rates, an IDS must be 
robust against noise data and false positives. Since Cloud 
infrastructure have enormous network traffic, traditional IDSs 
are not efficient to handle such a large data flow. Due to the 
large data sets, classification techniques require a huge amount 
of memory and CPU usage. Much of the proposed academic 
research on IDSs in the Cloud environment has focused on 
providing security mechanisms for specific security problems 
rather than trying to protect the Cloud as a whole. 
Hamad and Al-Hoby [23] propose the Cloud Intrusion 
Detection Service (CIDS), which can be deployed by Cloud 
providers to enable clients to subscribe with the IDS in a 
service-based manner. It is a re-engineered version of Snort, 
which is an open-source network IDS/IPS. The model 
outperforms currently used solutions for service-based IDS but 
at the same time provides minimal overhead to the case of 
traditional IDS deployment for single network protection. 
Montes et al. [24] implemented GMonE, a Cloud monitoring 
tool which capable of being adapted to different kinds of 
resources, services and monitoring parameters. GMonE 
performs the monitoring of each element by means of 
GMonEMon, which abstracts the type of resource (virtual or 
physical). GMonEMon service monitors the required 
parameters and then it communicates automatically with the 
monitoring manager (GMonEDB) to send it the monitored data. 
This communication is done through a standard Java Remote 
Method Invocation (RMI) process.  
The work of Calheiros et al. [25] conveys an InterCloud 
project, through the use of agents called Cloud Coordinators 
and allows for an increase in performance, reliability, and 
scalability of elastic applications. The architecture proposed for 
the Cloud Coordinator could be applied to the intrusion 
detection domain, whereby it has to be present on each data 
center that wants to interact with InterCloud parties. The Cloud 
Coordinator is also used by users and brokers that want to 
acquire resources via InterCloud and do not own resources to 
negotiate in the market.  
The work of Chen et al. [26] aims to develop a new 
collaborative system to integrate a Unified Threat Management 
(UTM) via the Collaborative Network Security Management 
System (CNSMS). Such a distributed security overlay network 
coordinated with a centralised security center leverages a peer-
to-peer communication protocol used in the UTMs 
collaborative module and connects them virtually to exchange 
network events and security rules. The CNSMS also has a huge 
output from operation practice, e.g., traffic data collected by 
multiple sources from different vantage points, operating 
reports and security events generated from different 
collaborative UTMs, etc. There is a vast amount of data 
generated which is not easy to analyse in real-time, but they also 
keep it archived for forensic analysis.  
Dhage et al. [27] propose an architecture in which mini IDS 
instances are deployed between each user of the Cloud and the 
CSP. As a result, the load on each IDS instance will be less than 
that on a single IDS and for this reason, the small IDS instance 
will be able to do its work in a more efficient way. For example, 
the number of packets dropped will be less due to the lesser load 
which single IDS instance will have. By proposing a model in 
which each instance of IDS has to monitor only a single user, 
an effort has been made to create a coordinated design, which 
will be able to gather appropriate information about the user, 
thus enabling it to classify intrusions in a better way. 
Lee [28] proposes a multi-level IDS and log management 
method based on consumer behaviour for applying IDS 
effectively to the Cloud system. They assign a risk level to user 
behaviour based on analysis over a period of time. By applying 
differentiated levels of security strength to users based on the 
degree of anomaly increases the effective usage of resources. 
Their method proposes the classification of generated logs by 
anomaly level, so that the system administrator analyses logs of 
the most suspected users first. 
Lo et al. [29] present a cooperative intrusion detection 
system framework for Cloud Computing networks. They 
deploy an IDS in each Cloud region, and each entity cooperates 
with each other through the exchange of alerts to reduce the 
impact of DDoS attacks. A Snort based IDS is implemented and 
the three main modules are plugged into the system: block, 
communicate, defence. A cooperative agent is used to receive 
alerts from other IDSs, and they are analysed using a majority 
vote in order to determine the accuracy of results. If deemed a 
legitimate alert, the blocking rule is implemented. By 
cooperative operation among these agents, early detection and 
prevention technique is implemented.  
Our analysis has shown that no unified model or unified 
detection and prevention approaches are established for 
detecting intrusions in the Cloud environment, nor is there a 
globally accepted metric or standard to evaluate against. It is 
clear that an IDS alone cannot protect the Cloud environment 
from attack. If an IDS is deployed in each Cloud Computing 
region, but without any cooperation and communication, it may 
easily suffer from single point of failure attack. Obviously, the 
abilities of intrusion detection and response are decreased 
significantly. Thus, the Cloud environment could not support 
services continually. Based on this concept, intrusion detection 
services deployed in each Cloud region collaborating is 
advised. These attributes will cooperate with each other to offer 
holistic security to those CSPs present, and add to the defence 
in depth. 
4. Security as a Service 
Cloud federation, present CSPs will benefit significantly if 
there is a comprehensive IDS that evolves based on their 
requirements. The security of applications and services 
provided in the Cloud, against cyber attacks, is hard to achieve 
for the complexity, heterogeneity, and dynamic nature of such 
systems [12]. Distributed collaboration among heterogeneous 
components within and across independent domains has been 
indicated in recent literature. The cooperation of threat 
knowledge, both known attacks and unknown threats; among 
CSP peers within the enterprise network or with other CSPs will 
contribute to better incident detection and prevention [13].  
This enhances Cloud security and provides faster and more 
effective incident response. Information sharing in this 
approach is automated which we conceive to be an important 
aspect of our approach. Collaboration among CSPs in the 
federated Cloud could offer holistic security to those providers 
in this agreement. Based on a distributed system, collaboration 
could be used to trace an attack to the source domain [14]. The 
collaboration of CSPs could help trace the source of attack, 
identify location, and limit attack vectors. 
Cloud defence strategy needs to be distributed so that it can 
detect and prevent the attacks that originate within the Cloud 
itself and from the users using the Cloud technology from 
different geographic locations through the Internet. As the 
popularity of the services provided in the Cloud environment 
grows rapidly, the exploitation of possible vulnerabilities grows 
at the same pace [30]. The measurements required to obtain a 
comprehensive view on the status of the Cloud lead to the 
generation of a vast volume of data coming from multiple 
distributed locations [13].  
Attacks and failures are inevitable; therefore, it is important 
to develop approaches to understand the Cloud environment 
under attack. The current lack of collaboration among different 
components within a CSP, or among different providers, for 
detection or prevention of attacks is the focus of our work. Our 
current work focuses on the deployment of such a solution for 
CSP collaboration: Security as a Service. 
A Cloud federation requires that each provider has to share 
Cloud-related information with the federated Cloud providers. 
This sharing of knowledge in our approach would involve 
security information about malicious activities, new signatures, 
and suspicious IP addresses. Our Security as a Service entity 
would be present in each CSPs domain, and is composed of the 
following entities: the Cloud Broker, the Command and Control 
server (C2), the Super Node (SN), and the Monitoring Nodes 
(MN). A CSP is represented as a domain, and comprises a 
number of Super Nodes and a C2. A C2 manages its domain, 
communicates with C2s in other CSP domains, and coordinates 
a response to an attack.  
The Cloud Broker is queried when a decision needs to be 
made. Rather than communication occurring between the C2s 
when suspect actions have been observed, the querying C2 
would firstly prompt the Broker to check if the actions are 
legitimate or not. This would keep communication and network 
overheads down, as there would be an increase in network 
latency if there were queries every time something suspect was 
observed. For this reason, we have inferred the hierarchy that 
we have in our approach.  
Figure 1 visualises the levels of communication occurring 
between each entity in our solution: 
 
Monitoring Nodes 
Monitoring nodes deal with issues on a local level and 
communicate with their neighbouring nodes regarding systems 
states and signatures. Monitoring nodes contain a black list 
determined by the Broker, and a local grey list, which contains 
ambiguous observations.   
Monitoring nodes trigger a pre-alarm when a pre-defined 
threshold is violated. Specifically, a pre-alarm is sent when the 
observed value is compared with a global threshold, such as 
using CUSUM for traffic volume dynamics. CUSUM is a 
widely used anomaly detection algorithm that has its 
foundations in change point detection. In particular, an alarm is 
signalled when the accumulated volume of measurements are 
above some traffic threshold exceeds an aggregate volume 
threshold. The CUSUM algorithm considers the excess volume 
above the normal volume, hence accounts for the intensity of 
the violations. 
When a pre-alarm is sent, monitoring nodes add it to their 
local grey list. Let a monitored value on the monitoring node i 
at time t be xi (t), i  [1, n], where n is the number of monitors 
involved in the monitoring task, and the global threshold be T, 
 
 
Fig. 1. Levels of communication 
it  can be considered the state at t to be abnormal and triggers a 
state alert if  ∑ xi  (t)
n
i=1 > T, which we refer to as a global 
violation [31].  
𝑇 is decomposed into a set of local thresholds Ti, for each 
monitor 𝑖 such that ∑ Ti ≤
n
i=1 T. As a result, as long as xi(t) ≤
Ti , ∀i ∈ [1, n], i.e. the monitored value is lower or equal to its 
local threshold, the global threshold cannot be exceeded 
because ∑ xi(t) ≤  ∑ Ti ≤
n
i=1 T
n
i=1 . In this case, monitors do not 
need to report their local values to the super node.  
When xi(t) > Ti on monitor 𝑖, it is possible that ∑ xi(t) >
n
i=1
T.  
Hence, monitor 𝑖 sends a message to the super node to report 
a local violation with the value xi(t). 
 
Super nodes 
A Super Node has a parent/child relationship with a 
monitoring node under its management. The Super Node 
effectively communicates upstream with the C2 to query any 
suspicious actions. The hierarchy of communication means 
network latency is low, and communication occurs only when 
essential, or when thresholds are violated. The Super Node, 
based on the amount of monitoring nodes in its subset, observes 
the generated alarms, these alarms are counted and when the 
pre-alarm count is more than or equal to the threshold based on 
the amount on monitoring nodes, a belief is formed that there is 
an attack. The Super Node then sends this belief to the C2, who 
queries the Broker. 
 
Command and Control server (C2)  
The command and control server (C2) is effectively a domain 
management node. When a threat is detected in its domain, a 
belief is formed that an attack is underway. The C2 queries the 
Broker about the generated belief, to see if it is legitimate or 
not. C2s possess black lists comprised of attack signatures, and 
local grey lists provided by the SN and MN which contains 
ambiguous observations.   
 
Broker 
Currently, Cloud Brokers offer tools to manage applications 
across multiple Cloud providers. In the future, Cloud Brokers 
will offer services based on their knowledge of the Cloud 
providers infrastructure [32]. We could use this knowledge to 
offer Cloud Security as a Service, where the Broker has the 
knowledge base of Cloud attacks and behavioural profiles to 
identify threshold violations. The Broker is the security 
provider. This is propagated to the C2s present in each CSP 
domain.   
The Broker invokes a global poll procedure when a decision 
cannot be made. He queries the C2s in adjacent domains, and 
asks them to generate their own beliefs. They check their local 
grey lists to see if they have encountered the suspect actions 
previously. Their grey list is a function mapping signatures to 
beliefs. Each C2 generates their own belief, and the Broker uses 
Dempster-Shafer to fuse the different beliefs and to create one 
decision. This in turn can improve resilience to attack. The 
predefined black lists are of attack signatures, and the 
monitoring nodes can analyse anomalous actions and threshold 
violations. 
5. Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence 
For collaborative detection, we use the Dempster-Shafer 
(DS) theory of evidence. DS theory is a probabilistic approach, 
which implements belief functions which are based on degrees 
of belief or trust. Probability values are assigned to sets of 
possibilities rather than single events [24]. DS was first 
introduced as a mathematical framework for the representation 
of uncertainty. The main advantage of this algorithm is that no 
 
 
Fig. 2. Collaborative decision process activity diagram 
 
priori knowledge of the system is required, thus making it 
suitable for anomaly detection of previously unseen 
information [33]. Collaborative intrusion detection has been 
considered in several contributions where data provided by 
heterogeneous intrusion detection monitors is fused. 
Our intrusion detection algorithms in our solution are of two 
types: local detection algorithm and a fusion algorithm. The 
latter focuses on outputs provided by the local algorithm, thus 
forming a distributed collaborative intrusion detection method. 
DS executes as a main fusion node, an entity with the role to 
collect and fuse the information provided by the monitors, 
taking the final decision regarding a possible attack. An 
advantage of DS is its usefulness in combining data sent by 
different observers.  
In the decision making process, the uncertainty existing in 
the network often leads to the failure of intrusion detection or 
low detection rate. The DS theory of evidence in data fusion has 
solved the problem of how to analyse the uncertainty in a 
quantitative way. Figure 2 illustrates the actions taken in our 
collaborative decision process, where a C2 is invoked and 
queries the Broker regarding the suspect behaviour.  
 
Basic concepts of Dempster-Shafer [33] include: 
 
Definition 1 – The frame of discernment:  
A complete set describing all of the sets in the hypothesis 
space. Generally, the frame is denoted as θ. The elements in the 
frame must be mutually exclusive. While the number of the 
elements is 𝑛, the space will be 2n. 
 
Definition 2 – Basic probability assignment:  
It is a positive number between 0 and 1. It exists in the form 
of probability. The value of BPA denotes the degree supporting 
or refuting evidence, and is denoted as m(A). 
 
Definition 3 – Belief function: 
For 2θ ∈ [0,1], Bel(A) = ∑ m(B)B⊆A  describes the general 
belief supporting the hypothesis, where 2θ is the hypothesis 
space. 
 
Definition 4 – Plausibility function: 
For 2θ ∈ [0,1], Pl(A) = 1 − Bel(Ac) =  ∑ ∅B∩A=  describes 
the belief not refuting the hypothesis. 
 
According to the above concepts, the belief function and 
plausibility function are related by Bel(A) ≤ Pl(A).  
 
Then we call [Bel(A), Pl(A)] the Belief Range. 
 
Dempster-Shafer combination rule: 
DS utilises orthogonal sum to combine the evidences [34]. 
We define the belief functions, describing the belied in a 
hypothesis A, as Bel1(A), Bel2(A); then the belief function after 
the combination is defined as: 
 
Bel(A) = Bel1(A)⨁Bel2(A) 
The mass function after the combination can be described as: 
 
m(A) = K−1. ∑ m1(Ai)
Ai∩Bi=A
m2(Bj) 
 
Where 𝐾 is called Orthogonal Coefficient, and it is defined 
as: 
 
K = ∑ m1(Ai)
Ai∩Bi≠∅
m2(Bj) 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Overview of attributes in OPNET 
DS combines the beliefs expressed by monitors producing a 
single combined belief that is finally compared with the 
accumulative sum of the beliefs q. If the combined belief is 
greater than q, an alarm is raised [35].  
 
The monitors (based on the local detection algorithms) 
produce a single belief for each focal element: 
 ba: the belief that there is an attack 
 bn:  the belief there is not an attack (normal) 
 bna: the belief expressing an ambiguity: attack or no 
attack. 
 
DS’s theory of evidence can be regarded as the expansion of 
Bayesian Inference. The Bayesian inference needs priori 
knowledge as the foundation of inference. Furthermore, the 
inference is unable to provide a better way to analyse the 
“uncertainty” in a quantitative way. DS proposes the concepts: 
“belief” and “plausibility”, which can aid the theory to analyse 
the “incomplete” or “missing” quantitatively. In this way, the 
inference can guarantee the accuracy of the decision. 
6. Implementation details 
In the previous section, the design of the architecture was 
presented; comprising four tiers; Cloud Broker, Command and 
Control servers (C2), Super Nodes (SN) and Monitoring Nodes 
(MN). The main aim of Security as a Service is to provide 
collaborative intrusion detection in a federated Cloud 
environment. This is imperative for protecting critical 
infrastructure services and sensitive data, as their failure or 
unavailability of such processes has high socioeconomic 
implications [9].  
The system uses a hybrid IDS, and a Cloud Broker to 
propagate information to the C2 entities in each CSP domain. 
Monitoring nodes are used to observe the states and processes 
in the Cloud environment, and update each adjacent domain on 
any changes or suspicious activities, which they, in turn, would 
be updated and protected against.   
Collaborative security between CSPs in a Cloud federation 
can offer holistic security to those in this scheme. Information 
sharing in this approach is automated which we conceive to be 
an important aspect of our approach. For proof of concept we 
use a scaled number of entities but for future work we would 
expand our solution and adapt it to have a self-organising 
hierarchy. Dividing the system into domains makes the system 
more scalable. Domain management nodes (C2) may cooperate.  
Using OPNET, attributes of our system were implemented. 
OPNET is a large and powerful software which enables the 
possibility to simulate heterogeneous networks with various 
protocols. OPNET consists of a high level user interface, which 
is constructed from C and C++ source code, and also possesses 
a library of OPNET specific functions. One specific benefit of 
using this simulator is that all processes contain code to record 
performance metrics, which is favourable for observing both 
local and global statistics in our solution.  
Using OPNET, the topology for our solution was 
implemented as conveyed in Figure 3. This conveys a Cloud 
federation scenario, where each CSP has an end user in a sub 
network. The Cloud Broker was depicted as a Cloud entity; in 
addition, three Cloud Service Providers were added: CSP_1, 
CSP_2 and CSP_3. Connected to each CSP is a server, 
database, and a C2. Each Cloud entity contains Cloud network 
protocols, IP encapsulation, and primary transmitters and 
receivers. OPNET allows the user to simulate different 
scenarios and gather data and statistics from the chosen 
scenario.  
The current focus of our work is implementing our 
collaborative intrusion detection process. We have created an 
environment that facilitates the Cloud federation, and Cloud 
service providers present. Hierarchy in a network topology is 
achieved using subnets, which represent identical constructs in 
an actual network. Each CSP is connected to a subnetwork, the 
characteristics of which are illustrated in Figure 4. These allow 
us to simulate end users of the CSP, and how malicious actions 
from one could affect the interconnected domains. 
 The next step is to introduce the roles of MN and SN and 
finalise the DS algorithm, and global poll procedure in which 
the Broker queries the C2s. We are simulating from the point 
where a SN has observed pre alarms and believes there is an 
attack. Currently the main attributes of our solution have been 
implemented, and our next aim is to continue to refine the 
functionality, and test our hypotheses. A simulation study of the 
effects of DDoS attacks on the performance of the collaborative 
intrusion detection process and DS theory of evidence is 
required.  
 
Figure 5 shows the average delay in seconds of the 
aforementioned topology running. When we introduce our DS 
algorithm we need to ensure that it is lightweight and resource 
efficient, and doesn’t affect the operations of the Cloud 
services.  
  
 
 
Fig. 4. Subnet of CSP_1 
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper has presented our Security as a Service solution 
for collaborative intrusion detection in federated Cloud 
environments. Protecting the federated Cloud against cyber-
attacks is a key concern, since there are potential significant 
economic consequences. For proof of concept we have 
simulated attributes of our system using OPNET, and are 
currently implementing the intrusion detection process to prove 
our hypotheses. Current work in this area uses majority voting 
when making collaborative decisions, and this is often using 
binary inputs. Using a Cloud Broker to provide Security as a 
Service to service providers in a federation we can improve 
overall resilience to attacks.  
Our work involves the use of the Dempster-Shafer theory of 
evidence which takes in other information, providing more 
accurate results. Observations from different CSPs are 
correlated autonomously, in order to determine whether similar 
behaviour that is indicative of an attack or other issues have 
been observed in their domains. The integration of the decisions 
coming from different IDSs has emerged as a technique that 
could strengthen the final decision. Federated Cloud 
environments are growing areas in terms of adoption by critical 
infrastructure vendors, and large corporations, so our Security 
as a Service facilities this collaborative intrusion detection, and 
sharing of attack information among these different service 
providers.  
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